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Abstract 
 
Economic games like the ultimatum and the dictator game have been great tools 
used to challenge the classical assumption that individuals act solely out of self-
interest. They are two games that study the economic decision making of individuals.  
With this study, we aimed to show how humans are indeed driven by social 
preferences, by analysing the relationship between empathy and offers in both these 
games.   
Game effect was significant, which means offers in the ultimatum game and the 
dictator game were significantly different. As expected, offers in the ultimatum Game 
were significantly higher. 
 Offers were also divided into three groups (Low, Med, High) to check whether the 
individual's behaviors would change when different amount of credits were in play. 
No size effect was found. Also, the game effect was present in all three different sizes.  
We also defined strategic behaviors as being the difference of offers in both these 
games. 6 regressions were computed and the following results were obtained: 
affective empathy, as predicted, was a predictor of offers in the dictators game and 
the ultimatum game; contrary to what we predicted, when using the MET, cognitive 
empathy negatively predicted strategic behavior; when using the IRI, Empathy 
Concern (affective empathy) negatively predicted strategic behaviour. Also, when 
using the MET, cognitive empathy and negative affective empathy were predictors of 
offers in the dictators game. 
  
Keywords: Cognitive Empathy; Affective Empathy; MET; IRI; Economic Decision 
Making 
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Resumo 
Jogos Económicos como o jogo do ultimato e o jogo do ditador têm sido 
instrumentos utilizados para desafiar a suposição clássica de que as pessoas agem 
unicamente por interesse próprio. São dois jogos que estudam a tomada de decisão 
económica das pessoas.  
Com este o estudo, o nosso objetivo foi de mostrar como os humanos são, na 
realidade, movidos por preferências sociais, ao analisar a relação da empatia com 
ofertas de moedas nestes dois jogos económicos.  
O efeito de jogo foi significativo, o que significa que as os valores das ofertas no 
jogo do ultimato foram significantemente diferentes do valor das ofertas no jogo do 
ditador. Como previsto, as ofertas foram significantemente superiores no jogo do 
ultimato.   
As ofertas foram também divididas em três grupos: Baixas, Médias, Altas, para 
verificar se os comportamentos das pessoas mudariam dependendo do número de 
moedas em jogo. No entanto, nenhum efeito tamanho foi verificado. O efeito jogo 
esteve presente nos três tamanhos diferentes. Também definimos comportamento 
estratégico como a diferença de ofertas entre o jogo do ultimato e o jogo do ditador. 
Seis regressões foram computadas e os seguintes resultados foram obtidos: empatia 
afetiva, como previsto, foi um preditor de ofertas no jogo do ditador e também no jogo 
do ultimato; ao contrário do que previmos, usando o MET, empatia cognitiva previu 
negativamente comportamento estratégico; ao usar o IRI (Índice de Reatividade 
Interpessoal), a Preocupação Empática (empatia afetiva) previu negativamente o 
comportamento estratégico. Além disso, ao usar o MET, a empatia cognitiva e a 
empatia afetiva (para emoções negativas) foram ambas preditores de ofertas no jogo 
do ditador.  
Palavras-chave: empatia afetiva, empatia cognitiva, IRI, MET, Tomada de Decisão 
Económica 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Understanding the motivation behind individuals´ actions is extremely important 
when analyzing human behavior. 
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals make decisions solely out of 
self-interest.  The ultimatum/dictator game are two economic games designed to 
challenge this theory.  
Empathy is a topic that has been gaining strength and popularity throughout the 
last decades. Understanding what empathy is and its effects can create much value in 
organizations, or even in something as simple as everyday human interactions.  
This study aims to understand the effect that empathy has on economic decision 
making. This will be done by analysing the relationship between empathy and offers 
in an ultimatum and dictator Game. 
Chapter 2 covers the literature review, first focusing on empathy: what it is; types 
of empathy; how to measure it. It is followed by prosocial behaviors, which gives an 
insight into what they are, as well as the motivation behind these behaviors. Literature 
studying the relationship between these two variables, empathy, and prosocial 
behaviors, is then analyzed. The second half of this chapter introduces the ultimatum 
and the dictator Games. This section covers past studies done of these games and 
focuses on the relationship between empathy and offers within these games. There are 
two types of empathy: cognitive and affective. It is important to note that there are 
still doubts about how these two types of empathy relate to prosocial behaviors, more 
specifically, altruism. The relation between affective empathy and altruism seems to 
have achieved more consistent results, showing a positive relationship between these 
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two variables. However, there are still some studies that achieve opposite results. The 
relation between cognitive empathy and altruism is, however, still very much 
unknown.  No specific pattern of results has been achieved. This study will serve as 
an extra piece of literature that can hopefully create value and contribute to a better 
understanding of how all these different variables interact with each other. It is also a 
goal to understand whether the decision to offer more or less in an ultimatum/dictator 
game depends on the number of coins at stake in the game. That is why we will divide 
the database into three different groups for three different stake sizes. There is a 
possibility that when there are more coins at stake, people might tend to be less 
altruistic and more self-centered.   
Chapter 3 covers the hypothesis of this study, based on the literature review 
presented in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology of this study. Fifty individuals took part in this 
study. Self-report measures (IRI – Interpersonal Reactivity Index) and Behavioural 
measures (MET – Multifaceted Empathy Test) were used to measure empathy. The 
MET was also used to measure offers in the ultimatum and dictator game.  
Chapter 5 shows us the results obtained in this study. It starts by showing the 
descriptive statistics of the various variables. The correlation table and manipulation 
check follow it. It is in this manipulation check that we will observe whether there is 
or not a size effect (individuals behaving differently when different amounts of coins 
are in stake) as well as whether there is a difference in offers between the ultimatum 
and dictator Game. This difference in offers between these two games is something 
that we expect to happen based on the different sets of rules of these games. This will 
be analyzed throughout this study. Six regressions will be computed in this chapter 
to study the various relationships. 
Chapter 6 is the Discussion, where we will analyze the possible reasoning behind 
our results. We will compare our results to our initial hypotheses, and try to explain 
16 
 
possible deviations. This Chapter will also serve to suggest possible modifications 
made for future studies to understand this topic better. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
2.1.  Empathy 
Empathy was first referred to as the propensity of individuals to project themselves 
into that of which they observe. According to Lipps (1926), witnessing a human’s 
emotional state leads the observer to imitate the other´s emotional cues, which results 
in the fabrication of similar, even though weaker, reactions in the observer.  
Empathy and sympathy are sometimes hard to differentiate. If we look back at 
Smith (1759), we can see that his definition of sympathy, of imagining and placing 
yourself in others’ situations, is now much more relatable to the term empathy. 
Empathy suggests a more active attempt by someone to get “inside” the other, to 
understand others feelings as though we were having them ourselves.  
To Titchener (1909), empathy is identified as the deliberate effort made by someone 
to step outside himself/herself and "into" the experiences of others. This could be 
accomplished by viewing and interpreting the other person's movements, actions, and 
physical cues. Piaget (1932) suggests that this ability of role-taking, is said to increase 
throughout childhood.  
Empathy is also described as someone reacting emotionally because he/she 
perceives that another individual is experiencing or on the verge of experiencing an 
emotion (Stotland, 1969). However, this study says nothing about the existence or not 
of similarity between the observer's emotion and the other person's emotion.  
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In accordance with Eisenberg & Strayer (1987) and Hoffman (1984) for empathy to 
exist, there must exist at least similarity between the emotion felt by the observer and 
the emotion felt by the target. Batson states that it is not enough that the emotion felt 
by these two individuals is the same. To him, empathy must only be associated with 
feelings of compassion.  Davis (1994) explains how empathy is the affective reaction 
to the emotions of another person, the cognitive act of adopting that person´s 
perspective, a cognitively based understanding of the other person as well as the 
communication of such understanding. 
As we can see, since the beginning of the study of empathy, it has been hard to 
create a universal definition that everyone can agree on. However, even though the 
specifics may differ from author to author, the generally accepted idea of empathy 
revolves around the ability of an individual to understand and feel the emotions felt 
by another. As we can see from this definition, empathy can be divided into two 
different types of empathy: cognitive empathy, that focuses on an individual’s ability to 
understand another person´s emotions, and affective empathy, which focuses on the 
individual’s ability to feel the emotion felt by the other person. 
 
2.1.1. Cognitive Empathy and Affective Empathy 
Research suggests the existence of two different sides of empathy: affective 
empathy and cognitive empathy. Batson (2009), Blair (2005), Singer (2006) & Dziobek 
et al. (2008) are examples of studies that agree that empathy comprises of both 
affective and cognitive components and that it is meaningful to distinguish between 
them. Hodges and Myers (2007) asserts that affective empathy has three components: 
feeling the same emotion as the other person, personal distress (in response to 
perceiving that other person’s plight), and feeling compassion for another person. This 
last component is often what we call “empathy concern” and sometimes sympathy. 
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On the other hand, cognitive empathy refers to the extent to which we perceive that 
we have successfully guessed someone else’s thoughts and feelings. It includes easy 
tasks such as visual perspective-taking (e.g., standing in our living room and 
imagining what a person outside can see through the window) to complex tasks such 
as imagining another person´s guess about the beliefs of a third person. It is based on 
seeing, imagining, and thinking about the situation from the other person´s point of 
view. To be able to imagine what it would be like to be a specific person, one must 
possess some knowledge of that specific person´s personality or history, for example. 
Having greater cognitive empathy essentially means having more accurate and 
complete knowledge of the contents of someone else´s mind. While affective empathy 
suggests the experience of feelings compatible with another emotional situation, 
cognitive empathy signifies the understanding of other mental states (Edele, Dziobek 
& Keller, 2013). These two different sides of empathy have been identified as relying 
on different neuronal mechanisms (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, 
& Northoff, 2011).  
Every individual possesses different levels of affective and cognitive empathy. 
Studies have shown that an individual´s cultures and upbringings affect these levels 
of empathy. For example, results from Cassels et al. (2010) showed that young adults 
from East Asia reported lower levels of empathy concern than young adults from 
Western countries. Also, Birkett (2013) found that American college students scored 
significantly higher on the Empathy Concern sub-scale than Chinese college students.   
Atkins (2014) achieved results which showed that British adults reported higher levels 
of empathic concern, but lower levels of cognitive empathy, in comparison to Chinese 
individuals.  
Different studies may measure empathy with different methods. It is essential to 
understand the various options of measuring empathy and the critical differences 
between these options. 
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2.1.2  Measuring Empathy 
There are a variety of methods used to measure empathy: self-report measures, 
behavioral measures, and physiological measures. Self-report measures are done by 
asking participants to complete specific questionnaires. It is the most used measure, 
due to its cost and facility.  However, in self-reports, individuals can be dishonest, lack 
the introspective ability to provide an accurate response to the question, or not 
understand the question (Hoskin, 1995). A person might self-report to be someone 
very good at understanding how others feel when, in reality, that might not be the 
case. Various biases may affect the results.  
Behavioral measures, in contrast to self-report, can discover an individual’s 
capabilities, by analyzing its answers or behaviors. Participants´ behaviors are 
observed and recorded. This may be done in a structured laboratory setting or a more 
natural setting, for example. Being able to observe how an individual acts and being 
able to check individuals´ answers to specific questions gives us a more unobstructed 
view of that individuals´ true capabilities. Furr & Funder (2007) asserts that the most 
prominent and necessary way to assess an individual´s personality is to in fact see 
how they act.  
Lastly, we have the existence of physiological measures, that focus on recording 
changes in a person's central and autonomic nervous system when presented with a 
particular situation. Emotional arousal tends to be associated with changes in 
physiological responses as assessed by heart rate, palmar sweating, skin conductance, 
etc. This type of measure can be beneficial for individuals that are unable to decipher 
or accurately communicate their emotional states, like young children. Behavioral 
measures and physiological measures tend to be more time consuming and costlier.  
For this reason, they are not used as frequently as self-report measures. 
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a) Self-Report Measures 
Developed by Mark H. Davis (1980, 1983), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
is a widely-used measurement tool to assess empathy. As reported by Davis, empathy 
consists of a set of separate but related constructs. It is able to evaluate the affective 
and cognitive dimensions of empathy. It contains the following four seven-item 
subscales: Perspective taking (reflects the tendency to spontaneously adopt another 
person´s point of view); Empathic Concern (capability of experiencing sentiments of 
compassion and worry for unfortunate others); Personal Distress (tendency to 
experience personal distress and discomfort in response to distress in others); Fantasy 
(capability to transpose oneself into fictional situations). Observing another person 
unleashes mechanisms that produce actions in the observer. Davis (1980, 1983), as well 
as translated versions of studies regarding the IRI, have shown the existence of a 
positive correlation between Empathic Concern and Perspective taking. Also, a 
positive correlation between Empathic Concern and Personal Discomfort. Another 
result, but with less consistency, is the negative correlation between Perspective 
taking and Personal Discomfort.  
 
b) Behavioral Measures 
Behavioral measures were developed to address the limitations of other empathy 
measures, primarily questionnaires.  
The Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008), usually referred to as MET, 
is a computer-based test that uses photographic stimuli to measure cognitive and 
affective empathy. It’s a test that consists of photographic images of emotional scenes, 
accompanied by four words (three distractor words and one target word). Individuals 
in the stimuli vary in gender, age, ethnicity, and socio-economic status. Using a nine-
point Likert-type scale, participants are asked to rate how strongly they experienced 
the feelings of the person showing on screen. They are then requested to select the 
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emotional state of that same person. Four options are presented.  The first request 
focuses on affective empathy, while the latter analyses cognitive empathy. 
Results from Foell, Brislin, Drislane, Dziobek, Patrick (2018) show the existence of 
significant positive correlations between empathy scores of the MET and empathy 
scores in the empathic concern and fantasy subscales of the IRI. By providing this 
alternative to conventional questionnaires, the MET can be a valuable supplement in 
the study of empathy. 
 
c) Physiological Measures 
Many factors can influence Self-report measures, and an individual always has the 
option of not answering truthfully. With physiological measures, this is not possible 
since it is an emotional response.  
Physiological measures have been used for decades to assess empathic and related 
reactions (e.g., Stotland, 1969). These measures tend to be captured by electronic 
equipment connected to the individual's body. They can be done by measuring the 
heart rate, skin conductance, or using psychophysiological methods for example, like 
neuroimaging. Studying the gestural, facial, and vocal indices of empathy-related 
responding is also an option. As stated by Eisenberg & Miller (1987), physiological 
measures indicate an emotional reaction but do not explain cognitive processes.  
There is a lot more knowledge regarding self-report and behavioral measures than 
physiological measures.  The most significant disadvantage of these measures is the 
impracticality surrounding them. Also, to Zhou, Valiente, and Eisenberg (2003), it is 
unclear whether physiological measures allow one to distinguish between empathy, 
sympathy, or personal distress. Nevertheless, in future studies, understanding this 
relationship can be crucial to understand empathy better. 
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Being able to understand how empathy affects an individual's thought process and 
behaviors is extremely important. Past research has shown the existence of a positive 
correlation between empathy and prosocial behaviors. It is, therefore, essential for us 
to understand what a prosocial behavior is, what is the motivation behind these 
behaviors, as well as its relation with empathy. 
 
2.2 Prosocial Behaviours: Definition, Motivation and its Relation to 
Empathy 
Prosocial behaviors have usually been defined as intentional, voluntary behaviors 
that result in benefits for another (Eisenberg, 1982). However, the reasoning behind 
these behaviors may not always be altruistic.    
Determining the reasoning behind prosocial behaviors is not easy. It can be 
motivated by empathy, sympathy, personal distress, as well as other factors 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Typically, when we think of prosocial behaviors, we 
usually think of positive intentions. However, it is not uncommon for people to have 
egoistical reasoning behind these actions. Prosocial behaviors can be a way to boost 
reputation or social status, for example. Still, lots of prosocial behaviors come from 
altruistic intentions. These behaviors are the ones that are generally associated with 
empathy and sympathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). According to the empathy-
altruism hypothesis (Batson & Coke, 1981), empathy promotes altruistic prosocial 
behaviors. It emphasizes on the role of affective empathy and its relationship with 
altruism. Having empathy creates an altruistic motivation of increasing another 
individual´s welfare. This hypothesis suggests that individuals with higher levels of 
empathy would be expected to act in a more responsive way to the feelings of another 
(Andreoni & Miller, 2002).  
A model to try to differentiate between altruistic motivated prosocial responding 
and egoistically motivated prosocial responding was developed by Coke, Batson, & 
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McDavis in 1978 and Batson & Coke in 1981. They suggest that when someone feels 
the need to reduce another person´s distress, there is a psychological cost for not 
helping that person. At the same time, another person but with egoistical intentions 
(ex: reduce the feelings of own´s distress), does not feel this psychological cost of not 
assisting. This person can escape these feelings of personal distress by merely escaping 
the situation without having to help the other person, if escaping is possible.  
Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, & Richardson (1978), and Batson, Cowles, 
& Coke (1979) are examples of studies that have been made regarding the relationship 
between empathy and prosocial behaviors. Studies involving this relation have been 
performed in both children and adults and have been made through different kinds 
of methods. The method of assessing empathy has been shown to influence the 
strength of this relation. Eisenberg & Miller (1987) divide all relevant studies up to 
1987 into seven groupings, with each grouping using a different method. A meta-
analysis is conducted for each of the groupings. Most of the experimental procedures 
used by researchers to manipulate empathic responding by altering participants´ 
internal states have shown the existence of a positive relationship between empathy 
and prosocial behavior. It is also clear that different methods of measuring empathy 
led to different degrees of the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior. 
After being tested with meta-analytic procedures, the only indices of empathy which 
was nonsignificant was picture/story procedures. The indices of empathy that showed 
a higher degree of relation differ from picture/story procedures because, in the latter 
index, the scenario is hypothetical, stimuli did not feel lifelike. 
On the other hand, the indices which were more highly related to prosocial 
behavior involved stimuli that were not presented as being hypothetical. If we look at 
studies involving experimental inductions or experimental simulations, the object of 
one´s empathizing and prosocial action has generally been the same (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). When this happens, it is reasonable to find a stronger relation between 
empathy and prosocial behavior. Also, in the indices where we saw a higher degree 
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of relation, the experiments were mostly done to adults. The relation in children seems 
to be weaker than in adults. A plausible explanation for this is because people's 
affective responses and behavioral reactions become more integrated with age.  
As we have seen, an individual's behaviors do not need to be solely motivated by 
self-benefits. Game theory studies cooperative and noncooperative approaches to 
social situations and games, where participants must choose between individuals and 
collective benefits. An individual’s actions affect not only himself but other 
participants as well. It is important to understand how empathy affects these 
decisions. The ultimatum game and the dictator game are two examples of economic 
games designed to question the assumption that people will act solely out of self-
interest.  
 
2.3.  Game Theory: Ultimatum and Dictator Game 
2.3.1. Ultimatum and Dictator Game: Rules 
Ultimatum Game 
 The ultimatum game is a popular game used in economic experiments. Two 
people take part in this game. Player A is tasked with splitting a certain sum of money 
with player B. Player B has the option to accept or refuse the offer. If accepted, the 
players split the money the way proposed. If player B refuses, then both players 
receive nothing.  
 
Dictator Game 
The dictator game is a derivative of the ultimatum game. The key difference is that 
Player B does not get the option to accept or refuse the offer. Player A dictates what 
each player will end up with, and the game ends there. 
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2.3.2   The Relation between The Ultimatum Game / Dictator Game and 
Empathy 
Boyd & Richarson (2005) explain how fundamental it is that community members 
share resources not only with people they are close with but also with anonymous 
others.  It is the key to establish and maintain common welfare in a society. However, 
the standard economic theory assumes that individuals act solely out of self-interest. 
Therefore, in an ultimatum/dictator game, the best play for player A is to offer the 
smallest positive share (assuming that not offering anything is not an option), and the 
best play for player B (in an ultimatum Game) is to accept any offer. However, in 
reality, this does not usually happen. There is an abundant number of examples of 
prosocial behaviors that go against economists’ predictions since it challenges the 
assumptions of the self-interest models of human behavior (Camerer, 2003). This 
provides evidence that humans are driven by social preferences, such as fairness and 
prosociality. A large amount of empirical evidence based on laboratory games has 
shown how actually our behaviours deviate from the economic prediction of profit 
maximization. 
The dictator game tries to help us understand why this deviation exists (Bolton, 
Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998; Henrich et al., 2004). Prosocial behaviors are susceptible 
to confounds (e.g., social desirability or the expectation of future reciprocity). Games 
like the dictator game are potent tools for the study of altruism as they control possible 
confounds (Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013). Contrary to what some people might 
think, studies regarding the dictator game show that individuals in the dictator 
position take fairness and potential adverse consequences into account when making 
their decision. According to Engel (2011), it is rare for player A to give nothing to 
player B. What this means is that the utility function that an individual wants to 
maximize, considers the welfare of the recipient. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin & Sefton 
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(1994), & Camerer & Fehr (2004) claim that only a minority of people act utterly selfish 
in the dictator game and keep the whole share for themselves. Brañas-Garza (2006) 
show how the amount given from Player A to Player B was substantially more 
significant when the dictators were aware of the recipient´s need of the money.  Since 
there is no risk of rejection in the dictator game, altruism is the only possible motive 
for positive offers. Studies have shown that individuals distribute approximately 20% 
to 30% of a stake to the other player in the dictators game (Forsythe et al., 1994; 
Camerer, 2003) and 40% of the stake in the ultimatum game (Camerer, 2003).  
In regards to the ultimatum game, and as stated above, the classical economic 
theory assumes that player B should accept every offer presented. This is because by 
not accepting, then that individual ends up with nothing. Therefore, it seems logical 
for player B to accept any offer player A makes. However, findings have shown show 
how most responders reject offers they deem unfair. Studies have suggested that 
individuals who reject offers of less than 50% do it because they want to punish player 
A (teach them a lesson, so they do not commit the same mistake in the future). As said 
by Camerer (2003), approximately half of the responders reject offers that are less than 
20% of the total amount of money. These offers are seen as unfair offers in the eyes of 
the responder. Page & Nowak (2002), Szolnoki, Perc, & Szabo (2012), and Iranzo, 
Floría, Moreno, Angel Sánchez (2012) suggest that empathic individuals will offer an 
amount that they would accept if the roles were reversed.  
Both these games have been used to study generosity and have shown that 
individuals with antisocial traits are associated with less generous offers (Koenigs et 
al., 2010). Several studies like Rand (2012) have suggested that, when placed under 
time pressure, individuals tend to contribute more in a public good game. These 
results inspired the FII (Fairness is Intuitive) hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that 
a decision-maker intuitively prefers fairness (ex: sharing resources in dictator game). 
However, other studies, like Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014), do not achieve the 
same results. Furthermore, Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) state that making decisions 
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under time pressure in a public good games leads to more selfish choices. According 
to Merkel & Lohse (2019), time pressure does not consistently promote fairness. 
Osumi & Ohira (2017) study the behavior of individuals with psychopathic traits in 
ultimatum and dictator games. Primary psychopathy has been directly linked to a lack 
of empathy. This study´s results showed that individuals who scored high on primary 
psychopathy offered a significantly larger amount of money in the ultimatum game 
than in the dictator game. Also, the amount of money offered to a friend was 
significantly higher than the amount they offered to a stranger. According to this 
study, the result that primary psychopathy tended to be associated with smaller offers 
suggest that primary psychopathy is associated with general deficits in the sense of 
fairness. 
Well supported theories emphasize a close relation of affective empathy and 
altruism (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; de Waal, 2008). This positive relationship between 
affective empathy and altruism has also been shown in recent studies of economic 
games (Barraza & Zak, 2009; Farrelly, Moan, White, & Young, (2015); Gummerum & 
Hanoch, 2012; Klimecki et al. (2016)).  However, the relation between cognitive 
empathy and altruism is more controversial (Batson et al., 2003). According to Li, Yu, 
Yang & Zhu (2019), although many prior studies have confirmed the role of affective 
empathy in promoting altruism in economic games, only a few studies have focused 
on cognitive empathy being a predictor of prosocial behaviour. Studies have not 
shown the same level of certainty on whether cognitive empathy has any influence on 
altruism. Studies like Bekkers (2006) and Davis (1983) have shown weak relationships 
between cognitive empathy and altruism. Gummerum and Hanoch (2012) found that 
affective empathy positively predicted altruism, while cognitive empathy did not. 
This result is also obtained by Edele et al. (2013). Li, Yu, Yang & Zhu (2019), however, 
a recent study from this year, obtained different results. Cognitive empathy was a 
predictor of offers in both Ultimatum and Dictator Games, while affective empathy 
was not. This study suggests that the results obtained may have differed from prior 
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studies due to the participants´ cultures. This study was done with Chinese 
individuals, while most prior studies were done with individuals from western 
countries. Findings from Atkins (2014) and Cassels et al. (2010) suggest that Eastern 
adults possess higher levels of cognitive empathy, but lower levels of affective 
empathy, than Western adults. Artinger et al. (2014) achieved similar results to the 
ones obtained by Li, Yu, Yang & Zhu (2019). As reported by this study, perspective 
taking (cognitive empathy) was a predictor of altruism, while empathy concern 
(affective empathy) was not. Individuals in this study, however, were German 
undergraduates, and not individuals from Eastern countries. These different results 
from different studies create undoubtedly a research gap that can only be filled with 
additional research. 
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Chapter 3 
Hypothesis 
 
Studies have shown that it is frequent for individuals to distribute more money in 
an ultimatum game than in a dictator game (Camerer, 2003). This is because, in an 
ultimatum game, the individual receiving the offer can reject it. Therefore, it is crucial 
that Player A tries to understand how player B thinks, and therefore understands 
which offer player B would be willing accept. Essentially, player A´s offer may have 
a strategic component. In a dictators game, this does not happen. In this game, since 
player B does not have the option to reject, player A´s offer is purely prosocial. The 
dictator game rules out other motives than the intention to benefit others. Bolton & 
Ockenfels (2000) and Camerer (2003) state that the amount of money offered in a 
dictator game constitutes a measure of altruistic sharing tendencies. 
 If a particular individual has ten coins to divide and decides to offer five coins in 
both games, then we can say that that person is acting purely prosocially in both 
games, and not strategically. On the other hand, if a person decides to give away five 
coins in an ultimatum game but only two coins in a dictators game, then we know that 
this person´s offer in the ultimatum game has some strategic reasoning behind it. Since 
in the ultimatum game, there is the altruistic prosocial component and the strategic 
component, and in the dictator game, there is the only the altruistic prosocial 
component, we can define our strategic component as being the difference in offers in 
the ultimatum game and the dictator game.  
At the same time, we have also seen the existence of a positive relationship between 
empathy and prosocial behaviors. It has also been suggested that empathic 
individuals make offers they themselves would be prepared to accept. We expect to 
find a positive relationship between empathy and the amount offered in these games. 
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Therefore, our hypothesis are the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Higher empathy, specifically affective empathy, will predict higher offers in a 
Dictators Game.  
We expect that higher scores on the empathic concern subscale of the IRI, will 
predict higher offers in a dictator’s game.  
Also, higher scores on the affective component of the MET will predict higher offers 
in a dictator’s game.  
Even though some studies achieve different results, a vast majority of research has 
discovered a positive relationship between affective empathy and altruistic behaviors. 
In a dictator’s game, offers are purely seen as altruistic prosocial behaviors, since there 
are no strategic benefits in offering more. Therefore, it is expected that affective 
empathy is a predictor of offers in a dictator’s game.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher empathy, specifically cognitive empathy, will predict higher strategic 
behaviors. 
Higher scores on the Perspective Taking sub-scale of the IRI and the cognitive 
component of the MET will predict higher difference scores between the offers in the 
ultimatum and dictators game.  
We have defined strategic behavior as the difference between offers in the 
ultimatum game and the dictator game. The concept of cognitive empathy tells us that 
higher levels of cognitive empathy essentially means having a better ability to 
understand what is going on in someone's mind and understand how they feel at any 
moment.  
Let us look at two different scenarios. An individual with high levels of affective 
empathy is expected to make the same offer in both games. We expect, just like we 
have seen in hypothesis 1, that affective empathy will lead to higher offers. If an 
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individual is making high offers in a dictator’s game, then we can expect the same 
thing to happen in the ultimatum game. The strategic component of the ultimatum 
game will not exist in this scenario, since the offer should be sufficiently good enough 
to be accepted by the other player. Now let us look at another individual, that has high 
levels of cognitive empathy but low levels of affective empathy. This player is 
expected to make low offers in the dictator’s game since offers in this game are seen 
as altruistic prosocial behaviors. However, in the ultimatum game, this player that has 
high levels of cognitive empathy, will understand that if he/she makes a low offer, 
then the offer will most probably not be accepted by the other player. For this reason, 
we expect that individuals with the capability of shifting perspective and taking on 
the role of the other players ‘mind (higher levels of cognitive empathy), will be able to 
strategically adjust its offer to ensure the other player accepts it. It is, therefore, 
plausible to hypothesize that cognitive empathy will be a predictor of strategic 
behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher empathy, either cognitive or affective, will predict higher offers in an 
ultimatum game. 
Higher scores on the Empathy Concern and Perspective Taking sub-scales of the 
IRI, will predict higher offers in an ultimatum game. 
We have said that in the dictator game offers are purely altruistic, driven by 
affective empathy.  
In the ultimatum game, we can expect that offers will be partly explained by the 
altruistic prosocial component explained by affective empathy, and the strategic 
component explained we observer in hypothesis two, explained by cognitive 
empathy. Therefore, we expect both affective and cognitive empathy to be predictors 
of offers in an ultimatum game.   
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
4.1.    Participants 
A total of 50 Portuguese students took part in this study (25 Female). The mean age 
of all participants was 26.56, with a standard deviation of 6.115. The youngest 
participant was 18 years old, while the oldest was 46 years old.  
 
4.2.     Measures 
4.2.1  Empathy  
       Empathy was measured through self-report as well as behavioral measures. 
Regarding self-report measures, a modified Portuguese version of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI) was used (Limpo, Alves, & Castro (2010)). This scale has four 
subscales, each made up of 7 different items. An example for each of the subscales are 
the following: “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy´s” point 
of view” (PT, α ) ); "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate 
than me" (EC); "In emergencies, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease" (PD); "I daydream 
and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me" (FS).  
Participants were asked to answer 28 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
“Does not describe me well” to “Describes me very well”. 
       In regards to behavioral measures, participants were asked to complete in the 
computer the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET). This test consists of 40 photographic 
images of emotional scenes accompanied by four words (different emotions). 
Participants were instructed to choose the word which corresponded to the emotional 
scene shown. This measured the cognitive empathy of the individual. After that, 
individuals were asked to rate how intensely they experienced the feelings of the 
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individual shown on screen. This was done using a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging 
from 1 = not at all to 9 = very strongly. This measured the individual’s affective 
empathy. 
 
4.2.2.  Offers in the Ultimatum / Dictator Game 
Participants were asked to sit in front of the computer and decide how many virtual 
coins to give to pictures of different people in an ultimatum game and a dictator game. 
Each round, a number popped up on the screen, mentioning how many coins the 
participant had for that round. Participants would then choose the amount to give to 
the other player. At the end of each round, an alert popped up, showing whether the 
offer had been accepted or rejected. 
 
4.2.3.  Computed Measures 
The variables DT and UG are measures that represent the Mean offer sent by the 
participants.  
To understand if an individual’s decision was influenced by the size of the stake 
(amount of virtual coins in play), the following variables were created: DT Low, UG 
Low, DT Med, UG Med, DT High, UG High. These variables will be used to 
understand whether the participant's behaviors changed depending on the size of the 
stake decision.   
The variable “Difference in Offers” was also created, and it represents the Mean 
Offer in an ultimatum game minus the Mean Offer in a dictators game (UG-DG). 
Affective Empathy was also divided into two groups: Affective Empathy + and 
Affective Empathy -, where “+” and “-“ signify positive and negative emotions. 
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Chapter 5 
Results 
 
The following table shows the descriptive statistics of the various subscales of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), as well as the sub-scales of the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test (MET). 
 
  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: IRI and MET 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
IRI Perspective Taking 12 24 18.6 2.87 
IRI Empathy Concern 9 24 18.3 4.15 
IRI Personal Distress 0 21 11.2 3.95 
IRI Fantasy 6 24 15.6 4.34 
MET Cognitive Empathy 0.88 1.00 0.96 0.04 
MET Affective Empathy + 1.25 8.60 5.57 1.40 
MET Affective Empathy - 2.65 8.50 6.16 1.52 
Note. SD: Standard Deviation; +: positive; -: negative. 
 
 
 
The following table shows the correlations between items of the IRI subscales, MET 
subscales, and the various Stake Decisions. 
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Table 2. Correlation Table 
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
***. Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) 
 
Note. PT: Perspective Taking; EC: Empathy Concern; PD: Personal Distress; F: Fantasy; CE: Cognitive Empathy; 
PAE: Positive Affective Empathy; NAE: Negative Affective Empathy; DT-L: Mean Offer in a Dictator Game – Low; 
DT-M: Mean Offer in a Dictators Game – Medium; DT-H: Mean Offer in a Dictators Game – High; UG-L: Mean 
Offer in an Ultimatum Game – Low, UG-M: Mean Offer in an Ultimatum Game – Medium; UG-H: Mean Offer in 
an Ultimatum Game – High. 
 
 
 PT EC PD F CE PAE NAE DT-L DT-M DT-H UG-L UG-M 
UG-
H 
Perspective 
Taking 
-             
Empathic 
Concern 
.387** -            
Personal 
Distress 
.041 .271 -           
Fantasy .127 .428** .409** -          
Cognitive 
Empathy 
.055 .148 -.156 .049 -         
Affective 
Empathy + 
.216 .248 .159 .081 .197 -        
Affective 
Empathy - 
.333* .335* .156 .168 .058 .504*** -       
DT Low .276 .335* -.050 .199 .423** .358* .362* -      
DT Med .268 .323* -.023 .208 .384** .365** .315* .956*** -     
DT High .281 .315* -.085 .185 .334* .341* .346* .921*** .963*** -    
UG Low .234 .276 -.077 .119 .171 .400* .318* .740* .751*** .747*** -   
UG Med .238 .199 -.113 .122 .189 .387** .241 .726*** .765*** .743**** .937*** -  
UG High .242 .161 -.105 .61 .182 .325* .274 .707*** .746*** .746*** .872*** .931*** - 
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5.1.  Manipulation Check: effects of game and size on behavior 
A General Linear Model was created to check the existence of a significant 
difference in the amount given (stake decision) in both games (game effect), as well as 
check whether that real difference was present in all Low/Med/High Stake Decisions 
(Size effect). Game*Size effect was also analyzed. 
After applying the Huynh-Feldt correction for violation of sphericity (ε = .855 for 
size; ε = .777 for game*size interaction), the Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of game (F (1,49) = 20.6, p < .001, η2p = .295) higher offers in the ultimatum 
game (M = 4.66, SEM = .142) when compared with the dictator game (M = 4.04, SEM = 
.215). Neither a significant effect of size (F (2,98) = 1.19, p = .310) nor game*size interaction 
were found (F (2,98) = 1.59, p = .209) 
 
 
5.2. Regression Analysis 
Six linear regression models were computed to understand the relationship 
between the variables related to empathy and the offers in the ultimatum and dictator 
games. 
The first three regressions study the relationship between the sub-scales of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), with the mean offer in dictator and ultimatum 
games, as well as the Difference in Offers in both these games. 
The last three regressions study the relationship between the sub-scales of the 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET), with the amount given in dictator and ultimatum 
game, as well as the Difference in Offers in both these games. 
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Regression nº1 was calculated to predict the Mean amount given in an Ultimatum 
Game with Perspective Taking, Empathy Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy sub-scales 
of the IRI as predictors. No significant regression model was found (F (4,45) = 1.362; p 
= .262; AdjR2 = .029). 
Regression n°2 was calculated to predict the Mean amount given in a Dictator Game 
with Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy sub-scales of 
the IRI as predictors. A significant regression model was found (F (1,48) = 5.887, p = 
.02, AdjR2 = 0.091). Empathic Concern positively predicted the Mean amount given in 
Dictator Game (β = .331; p = .02). No other significant predictors were found.  
Regression n°3 was calculated to predict the Mean Difference in amount given in an 
Ultimatum Game and amount given in a Dictator Game with Perspective Taking, Empathy 
Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy sub-scales of the IRI as predictors. A significant 
regression equation was found (F (1,48) = 4.432, p = .041, AdjR2 = .065). Empathy Concern 
negatively predicted the Mean Difference in amount given in an Ultimatum Game and 
amount given in a Dictator Game (β = -.291, p = .041). No other significant relations were 
found. 
Regression n°4 was calculated to predict the Mean amount given in an Ultimatum 
Game with Cognitive Empathy, Positive Affective Empathy, Negative Affective Empathy 
scores obtained in the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) as predictors. A significant 
regression equation was found (F (1,48) = 8.193, p = .006, AdjR2 = .128).  Positive Affective 
Empathy positively predicted the Mean amount given in an Ultimatum Game (β = .382, p 
= .006). No other significant relations were found. 
Regression n°5 was calculated to predict the Mean amount given in a Dictator Game 
with Cognitive Empathy, Positive Affective Empathy, Negative Affective Empathy scores 
obtained in the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) as predictors. A significant 
regression equation was found (F (2,47) = 8.108, p =.001, AdjR2 = .225). Cognitive 
Empathy and Negative Affective Empathy positively predicted the Mean amount given in 
39 
 
a Dictator Game (β = .369, p = .005) and (β = .326, p = .013). No other significant relations 
were found. 
Regression n°6 was calculated to predict the Mean Difference in amount given in an 
Ultimatum Game and amount given in a Dictator Game with Cognitive Empathy, Positive 
Affective Empathy, Negative Affective Empathy scores obtained in the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test (MET) as predictors. A significant regression equation was found 
(F(1,48) = 9.937, p = .003, AdjR2 = .154). Cognitive Empathy negatively predicted the Mean 
Difference in amount given in an Ultimatum Game and amount given in a Dictator Game (β 
= -.414, p = .003). No other significant relations were found. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
 
This study aimed to understand how empathy (cognitive and affective) affects an 
individual’s decision making in an economic experiment setting. Using ultimatum 
and dictator games, the goal was to check whether higher levels of empathy would 
result in higher offers of credits. Also, the aim was to understand if an individual's 
offers change significantly when different amounts of credits are in play.   
The game effect showed statistical significance, which means, on average, the 
amount given by individuals in ultimatum and dictator games was significantly 
different. Offers in the ultimatum game were significantly higher than in the dictator 
game. This is a result that was expected, since in the ultimatum game, the individual 
receiving the offer, can opt to reject. The option to reject leads to strategic behaviors 
from the other individual. On the other hand, in a dictator game, no such option exists.  
Stake size effect did not reach statistical significance, which means individuals did 
not significantly change their offer percentage, for different amounts of credits at 
stake. A statistical insignificant effect of Game*Size shows us that the game effect 
obtained is observed for all three different Stake Sizes. For this reason, we will use the 
Mean amount offered in both games independently of the stake size, i.e., we will work 
with a composite variable that incorporates all three stake sizes.  
Table 2 helps us give an idea of existing significant correlations between various 
variables and the direction of these correlations. We can see some expected 
correlations, namely Perspective Taking with Empathy Concern, as shown in Davis 
(1980; 1983), as well as Fantasy with Empathy Concern and Personal Distress. 
Negative Affective Empathy was significantly correlated with Perspective Taking, 
Empathy Concern, and Positive Affective Empathy. 
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The Regression Models used allowed us to test the hypothesis of this study. If we 
look back at our hypothesis, hypothesis 1 predicts that higher empathy, specifically 
affective empathy, will predict higher offers in a dictators game. We can confirm this 
by looking at the results of regressions 2 and 5. Regression 2 shows us that the sub-
scale Emphatic Concern, of the IRI, was a predictor of the Mean amount given in a Dictator 
Game. Higher scores in the Emphatic Concern sub-scale of the IRI leads to higher 
offerings in a dictator game. Also, as we can see from Regression 5, Cognitive Empathy 
and Negative Affective Empathy are both predictors of the Mean amount given in a 
Dictator Game. Higher scores on these sub-scales of the MET are linked to higher 
offerings in a dictators game (higher prosocial behaviors). Results from this regression 
tell us that anticipating the other individuals’ state of mind as well as anticipating the 
experience of negative emotions due to unfair offers, leads to higher offers in a 
dictators game.  
As previously observed in the literature review, there have been many studies that 
point to this existing relationship between affective empathy and altruism (which is 
represented here by offers in a dictator game). Results from studies revolving the 
relationship between cognitive empathy and altruism are mixed, much less consistent. 
In our study, affective empathy was always a predictor of offers in a dictator game, 
independently of how empathy was measured. Cognitive empathy, however, was 
only a predictor of offers in a dictator game, when empathy was measured with the 
MET and not the IRI. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1 was only partially confirmed. Affective empathy was 
indeed a predictor of offers in a dictator game, but according to results obtained in 
Regression 5, it was not the only predictor.   
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher cognitive empathy would predict higher 
strategic behaviors. To answer to this hypothesis, we must look at Regressions 3 and 
6. We expected that offers in the ultimatum game would be significantly higher than 
the offers in the dictators game. This was successfully proven when analyzing the 
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existence of a game effect in Chapter 6.3, where we found that offers in the ultimatum 
game were significantly higher than offers in the dictator game. Strategic behavior 
was then defined as the difference between offers in the ultimatum game and the 
dictator game. We expected that individuals with higher levels of cognitive empathy 
would be better able to understand the contents of the other individuals´ minds and 
adjust his/her offer accordingly. These individuals will have an easier time 
understanding that other players might reject offers they deem unjust. In other words, 
these individuals will have a better understanding of the strategy behind the 
ultimatum game.  It was expected that this would lead to higher offers in the 
ultimatum game, to prevent the possibility of the offer being rejected. However, the 
results obtained were far from what was predicted. Regression 6´s results showed that 
cognitive empathy negatively predicted this difference between offers in both games. 
Essentially, the higher the level of cognitive empathy, the smaller the difference 
between both games (less strategic behavior). At the same time, Regression 3, which 
used the IRI to study this relationship, shows us that affective empathy negatively 
predicted strategic behavior.  The higher the levels of affective empathy, the smaller 
the difference in offers we will observe in these two games. According to this 
regression, cognitive empathy does not predict strategic behavior. This result opens 
up an interesting discussion. We have previously seen in hypothesis 1 that affective 
empathy was indeed a predictor of offers in the dictator and ultimatum game. As 
such, the higher the level of affective empathy, the higher offers we can expect in both 
games. An individual with high levels of affective empathy is more likely to display 
fairness oriented behaviors in both the ultimatum game and the dictator game. As 
such, the higher the level of affective empathy, the higher offers we can expect in both 
games. As a result, given that we operationalized strategic behavior as the difference 
in offers between the ultimatum game and the dictator game, the same pattern of 
behavior in both tasks would lead values in strategic behavior close to zero. As the 
displaying of strategic behavior and fairness-oriented behavior would lead to similar 
behavioral patterns in the ultimatum game, both dimensions of empathy seem to be 
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associated with increased offers. Given that both affective and cognitive dimensions 
of empathy are correlated, individuals with high cognitive empathy would also 
display increased scores in the affective empathy dimensions, bearing the dissociation 
of the relative weight of this dimensions as predictors of strategic behavior impossible 
in this context. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that Higher empathy, either cognitive or affective, will 
predict higher offers in an ultimatum game. We believed that empathy would predict 
higher offers in an ultimatum game because of two reasons. Firstly, the prosocial 
component, where we expect individuals to offer more because of the affective 
empathy they feel for the other person. The other component is the strategic 
component, where we expected individuals to offer more credits so that there is a 
lower chance of the other individual rejecting the offer. To check the validity of this 
hypothesis, we can observe regressions 1 and 4. Regression 1 measures the 
relationship between empathy and amount offered in an ultimatum game, using the 
IRI sub-scales. The regression did not find any significant relationship between these 
variables. 
On the other hand, regression 4 uses the MET sub-scales and finds a significant 
relationship between the amount offered and positive affective empathy in an 
ultimatum game. This regression tells us that anticipating someone’s positive 
emotions due to higher offers, will lead them to offer more. It is interesting to note 
that this existing positive relation between positive affective empathy and offer 
amount was only significant in the ultimatum game. In the dictator game, negative 
affective empathy was a predictor, and not positive affective empathy. Also, contrary 
to what we expected, cognitive empathy (that we thought would influence strategic 
behaviors and therefore higher offer amounts) did not show a significant relationship 
with the amount offered in an ultimatum game.   
It is also essential to analyze possible factors that may have contributed to these 
results. We have said that, in our view, there is no logical reason why someone would 
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offer more credits in a dictator game than in the ultimatum game. Since offers in the 
dictator game are seen as purely altruistic, there is no reason why that individual 
would not offer at least the same amount in the ultimatum game. However, if we look 
at our results, we can see that throughout 72 games, 11 individuals offered, on 
average, more credits in the Dictator Game than in the Ultimatum Game.  
It is plausible that the experimental setting, by not involving other real people, may 
not feel lifelike enough. As stated by Eisenberg & Miller (1987), the studies that 
showed higher degrees of relation between empathy and prosocial behaviors were the 
ones where the situation was not being presented as hypothetical. In our study, people 
are asked how many credits they would give to hypothetical individuals experiencing 
different emotions. It would be interesting to see the differences in results if the 
exchange of credits was done face to face. When being face to face with the other 
player, it is possible that individuals might take more time observing and studying 
the other person, and therefore cognitive empathy might lead us to different results. 
Also, affective empathy might be more impactful when being presented with a real 
person in front of you, than with a hypothetical person in a computer screen. 
Not only that, but the reward gained from these games is also a critical factor that 
influences decision making. When someone has nothing to lose, then it is hard to 
know its real intentions. No person minds losing fictional credits, because they are 
indeed fictional. When there is something in play that people care about is when we 
can really see a person’s real intentions.  
It is possible that the lack of reward in this study made it so individuals did not 
care about what amount of credits to give. It would be interesting to see how different 
the offers would be if the money in play were indeed real money. Individuals would 
maybe think twice before sending out certain offers, and we would be able to observe 
self-benefit VS altruism at its purest form.  
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In this study, the size effect was not significant, which means that individuals did 
not significantly change behaviors (offer patterns) depending on the amount of credits 
at stake. However, it has been suggested by Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, Sagarin, 
& Lewis (1997) that empathy increases only superficial minimal cost helping. It would 
be beneficial if future research study how human behavior changes when there is 
more real money in play. It is plausible to hypothesize that as more money is at stake, 
the larger the cost of assisting, and therefore the larger occurrence of egotistical 
behaviors.   
It is also important to note that the sample size of this study was only 50 
individuals, which is relatively low. Future research with higher sample sizes may be 
able to understand better how all these variables interact with each other.  
The understanding of the role of empathy in society will continue to develop as 
time goes on. If we look at the business world, work is becoming more team-based 
and requires adaptability and flexibility between people. Work teams with emphatic 
individuals are more cooperative and have fewer confrontations. Being emphatic 
helps you see things from various perspectives, which helps you develop. It is a crucial 
component of leadership. It is quite common to hear in society people complain about 
the bosses they have at work. Not all bosses have the ability to be good leaders. 
Humphrey & Adams (2016) state that empathy help leaders become more effective 
leaders by helping them establish empathic bonds with their followers. It helps leaders 
realize when others are in distress, and motivates leaders to take risks on behalf of 
others. We humans are “social creatures” and interacting positively with other people 
leads to higher levels of happiness, which in turn, will lead to better work 
environments, and better work productivity. We have examples of this even in sports, 
where there are examples of football players saying they would “die on the pitch” for 
their managers.  
We have previously explained how cognitive empathy can be defined as the ability 
to understand how another person feels and how they think. This can be extremely 
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useful with sales teams. A sales team with high levels of cognitive empathy will be 
better able to understand the needs of a consumer/customer.  A skilled salesperson 
must be able to anticipate costumers´ needs and adjust their sales pitch accordingly. 
A client wants to be understood. Empathizing with clients, showing them you 
understand how they feel, will create a bond and trust between you two. Also, since 
empathy has shown to boost happiness levels in the workplace, it may be a key factor 
in attracting top-performing individuals. Nobody wants to work in a negative 
workplace, where individuals do not feel valued, and bosses treat their employees 
poorly. Top performing individuals have many job offers, so having a positive 
workplace, with an emphatic leader, may be a way of attracting top talent to your 
organization. 
Research will continue to be made regarding the impact of empathy in society. 
However, there is no doubt that it has its abundant benefits, whether that is in the 
business world, or even something as simple as everyday human interactions. 
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